We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where …rms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected e¤ort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected e¤ort is higher with than without information sharing.
Introduction
Competing …rms can often commit to share relevant information with their competitors. Exchange of information not only takes place in joint ventures or cartels; one bene…t of joining an industry association is better access to industry data. The incentives to share information have been extensively studied in the literature on imperfect competition. Competition in some oligopolistic markets is, however, best described as a contest or an all-pay auction, and the incentives to share information ahead of a contest appear to have not yet been explored. To date, the main focus of the literature has been on the implications of whether …rms' decision variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. In the all-pay auction, however, these notions do not …t since the best replies may be nonmonotonic, involving either marginal overbidding, or spending zero e¤ort. 1 The aim of this paper is to analyze this case.
The strategic interaction between …rms in many markets has the characteristics of a contest. This is particularly true of markets with intense advertising or promotional competition (Schmalensee 1976 (Schmalensee , 1992 , and in R&D races. Lichtenberg (1988) stresses the importance of 'design and technical competitions' for public procurement and points out that these competitions are best understood as contests. Dasgupta (1986) uses the all-pay auction with complete information as a model of R&D races and research tournaments. In a similar structure, Kaplan et al. (2003) analyze …rms'innovation activities when potential gains are endogenous. See Konrad (2007) for a survey. This paper examines a popular type of contest, often used as a benchmark in the contest literature: an all-pay auction. 2 The all-pay auction has been studied under a wide range of assumptions concerning the information possessed by competitors (Weber 1985 The literature on information sharing in oligopoly is extensive and we do not attempt to survey it here. Early contributions include Ponssard (1979), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) , Vives (1984) , and Gal-Or (1985) . Raith (1996) presents a fairly general model that encompasses many of the known results; Vives (1999, Chapter 8) contains an overview. Most closely related to our paper are studies of information disclosure in R&D competition, going back to Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) . Gill (2008) and Jansen (2008) are recent contributions, and also include overviews of the literature. Our contribution to this literature is to focus on the two-player all-pay auction structure and on the incentives to reveal one's value of winning the contest to one's competitor. We also study the social e¢ ciency of the decision to share information and …nd conditions under which a legal prohibition of information sharing or, alternatively, a requirement to share information, is welfare improving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Firms receive private information about the value they derive from winning the contest. If private information pertains to some …rm-speci…c characteristic such as the cost structure, a model with private values may be appropriate; Section 3 considers this case. On the other hand, if the information is about some circumstances which are common to the …rms such as demand conditions, we have common values; we study this case in Section 4. We summarize our …ndings in Section 5.
exogenous noise, such as the Tullock (1980) or Lazear & Rosen (1981) models, generally require su¢ cient noise to ensure pure-strategy equilibria in the complete information game. Alcalde and Dahm (2008) and Che and Gale (2000) have recently shown that contests with "small" amounts of exogenous noise share many of the same properties as all-pay auctions.
The model
There are two …rms i = 1; 2: At stage 1, each …rm decides whether or not it will share information. In the literature, there are two approaches concerning how to model these decisions. We will describe each in detail below. Between stage 1 and stage 2, each …rm receives a private signal s i about its value v i of winning the contest. We assume that the signals s 1 and s 2 are independent draws from a cumulative distribution function F with support
We assume that F is continuously di¤erentiable. In the case of private values analyzed in Section 3 below, each …rm's value of winning is equal to its signal. In Section 4, we investigate a common values environment in which each …rm's value of winning equals a nonnegative continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and symmetric function of the two signals. In stage 2; …rms choose their outlays or e¤orts x i 2 R + : The higher e¤ort wins; ties are broken randomly. Thus the probability that …rm i wins is given by
The expected pro…t of …rm i is equal to p i v i x i :
As noted above, there are two main approaches to information sharing in the literature: the decision whether or not to share information can be either unilateral, or a bilateral agreement. In the …rst approach, decisions to share information are taken simultaneously and independently. These decisions are binding commitments. Hence, if …rm i has decided to share information, …rm j 6 = i also learns the signal s i before the e¤orts are chosen; otherwise, s i is private information to …rm i: In an alternative approach, the …rst stage decisions on information sharing are treated as an industry-wide agreement, where a …rm shares its information before stage 2 if and only if the other …rm does so as well. Here, in stage 1 both …rms simultaneously indicate whether they would like an industry-wide agreement on information sharing. If both indicate that they want it, then all information is shared. If at least one …rm indicates that it does not want to share, then no …rm's information is shared. Note that in both approaches, 'sharing information' can be thought of as 'providing hard evidence that fully reveals the realization of one's signal'. 3 Finally, we assume that social welfare depends on the …rms' expected pro…ts. Moreover, the …rms'e¤orts may be socially desirable in themselves. For example, if x i is innovative e¤ort, it may provide positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. Thus, we assume that
Here, 0 is a parameter that expresses the social value of the e¤orts not directly captured by the …rms in the industry. Throughout, we analyze whether equilibrium information sharing is socially e¢ cient. In particular, we study whether prohibiting information sharing, or forcing the …rms to share information, increases welfare.
Private values
In this section, we assume that each …rm's value of winning the contest coincides with its signal, v i = s i for i = 1; 2. That is, each …rm is privately informed about the value it derives from winning, and this value is independent of the other …rm's value.
Industry-wide agreements
We begin the analysis with the simpler case of industry-wide agreements. Here we only have to consider the symmetric situations in which either both …rms share their information, or both keep their information secret. The corresponding subgame equilibria are well known.
Both …rms share information If both …rms share their information, the resulting subgames have complete information, and the all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies (Baye, Kovenock, de Vries 1996) . 4 Without loss of generality, let s 1 s 2 ; which corresponds to v 1 v 2 .
Firms play the following mixed strategies:
To see this is an equilibrium, note that the expected pro…t of …rm 1 from an e¤ort x 1 2 [0;
A higher e¤ort leads to a higher probability of winning, which is just outweighed by the increased costs; thus …rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these e¤ort levels. Moreover, choosing an e¤ort x 1 > s 1 is suboptimal, since it leads to negative expected pro…ts. Similarly, …rm 2 is indi¤erent between all x 2 2 (0; s 1 ] ; since they all give the same expected pro…t:
To summarize, the expected pro…t of a …rm i equals max fs i s j ; 0g. Since …rms decide on information sharing before they know their own value, this decision is based on the ex ante expected pro…t, i.e. the expectation at the beginning of stage 1. Firm i's ex ante expected pro…t from an agreement to share information is equal to
No …rm shares information If no …rm shares information, then stage 2 is characterized by two-sided incomplete information. The equilibrium is in increasing strategies: a …rm that receives a signal s chooses e¤ort
To see that this is an equilibrium, consider the expected pro…t of …rm i; given that …rm j follows this strategy. 5 Suppose …rm i chooses an e¤ort of
Equivalently, …rm i bids according to but as if it had received a signal z such that x i = (z) : The expected pro…t of …rm i equals
Since the integrand is positive if and only if s i is greater than t; the optimal choice is z = s i ; and hence x i = (s i ) as in (2) . Interim expected pro…ts, conditional on s i ; equal
and ex ante expected pro…ts are
Comparing (1) and (3) shows that expected pro…t when both …rms share information is equal to expected pro…t when no …rm shares information. Proof. The equivalence of …rms' pro…ts in the two cases has been shown above. Therefore, if …rm i proposes to share information, …rm j is indi¤erent whether or not to agree. Thus both cases can arise in equilibrium. It remains to consider the implications for expected e¤orts. Suppose no …rm shares information and denote expected e¤ort of …rm i by E x
Now suppose both …rms share information. Conditional on s 1 and s 2 ; expected e¤ort of …rm i is equal to s j =2 if s i > s j ; and equal to s 2 i = (2s j ) if s i < s j : Therefore, the ex ante expected e¤ort of …rm i equals
The di¤erence is
where the second equality uses Fubini's theorem. Renaming the variables of integration in the …rst term by exchanging i and j; we get
Proposition 1 indicates that an industry-wide agreement to share information may occur in equilibrium, but depresses e¤ort. In the context of a procurement contest or an R&D race, for example, where it might be expected that e¤ort has positive spillover e¤ects, banning industry-wide information sharing would result in a Pareto improvement. Since pro…ts of the …rms are unchanged, but the e¤orts are higher, when > 0; welfare is higher. The amount by which the e¤orts increase is exactly equal to the gain in allocative e¢ ciency: without information sharing, the …rm with the higher value wins the contest with probability one, whereas with information sharing the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and thus the …rm with the lower value sometimes wins.
Independent commitments to share information
In this section, we turn to the two stage model, where …rms independently decide whether or not to commit to share information. Here, if exactly one …rm shares its information, an asymmetric situation arises at the contest stage: the signal, and hence the value, of one …rm is common knowledge, while the value of the other …rm is its private information.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that …rm 1 has committed to share information, whereas 2 has committed not to share information. The equilibrium will then exhibit a mixture of the properties of the equilibria in the two symmetric cases discussed above. Firm 1; whose value is common knowledge, will randomize continuously according to a cumulative distribution function which we denote by B 1 : Firm 2, on the other hand, will choose e¤ort as an increasing function of its privately known signal. Firm 1 may choose zero effort with a positive probability, which we denote by B 1 (0) 2 [0; 1). Similarly, there may be a signal s 0 such that …rm 2 chooses zero e¤ort for all signals
is the ex ante probability that …rm 2 chooses an e¤ort of zero.
Lemma 1 (Morath and Münster 2008a) Suppose that only …rm 1 shares its private information. In the unique equilibrium of stage 2, …rm 2 plays the following pure strategy:
Firm 1 randomizes according to
B 1 (0) and s 0 are uniquely de…ned by min fB 1 (0) ; F (s 0 )g = 0 and B 1 ( 2 (s h )) =
1.
Proof. Here we only show that this is an equilibrium; for the proof of uniqueness see Morath and Münster (2008a) . Consider …rm 1 and suppose that …rm 2 follows the strategy in (4). Firm 1's pro…t from an e¤ort x 1 2
Thus …rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these e¤orts. Higher e¤orts are clearly suboptimal, since they might be lowered without decreasing the chances to win. Whenever s 0 > s l , an e¤ort of zero is also suboptimal, since it involves the risk of losing the contest even in case that …rm
Since 1 2 is strictly increasing, the pro…t of …rm 2 is strictly concave in x 2 . The maximum is thus unique and described by the …rst order condition
together with the complementary slackness condition. If s 0 < s 2 , we have an interior solution with
Otherwise, an e¤ort of zero is optimal. It remains to show that B 1 (0) and s 0 are uniquely determined. Note …rst that …rm 1 won't choose an e¤ort that is higher than the highest possible e¤ort of …rm 2, and thus B 1 ( 2 (s h )) = 1. With the substitution 1 2 (z) = s, the boundary condition B 1 ( 2 (s h )) = 1 can be written as
The …rst term is continuous and strictly decreasing in s 0 ; moreover, it would vanish is s 0 were equal to s h : It follows that B 1 ( 2 (s h )) = 1 has a unique solution that ful…lls min fB 1 (0) ; F (s 0 )g = 0.
As in the case where both …rms share information, the distribution of e¤orts of …rm 2, considered from the point of view of …rm 1; is a uniform distribution, with possibly a mass point at zero. Moreover, the slope is just 1=s 1 : For …rm 1; a higher e¤ort leads to a greater chance of winning, which is just outweighed by the higher cost. Thus …rm 1 is indi¤erent between the e¤orts it randomizes over.
It is straightforward to see that, in equilibrium, at least one of the mass points B 1 (0) and F (s 0 ) must be zero. Suppose to the contrary that
Then …rm 1 chooses an e¤ort of zero with strictly positive probability. But choosing a su¢ ciently small but strictly positive e¤ort " gives a higher pro…t: the probability of winning increases discretely at an arbitrarily small cost, contradicting equilibrium. Thus, at least one of the mass points is zero. Whether …rm 1 or …rm 2 has a mass point at zero depends, in general, both on the distribution function F and on the realization of the signal s 1 . For future reference, note that (6) together with min fB 1 (0) ; F (s 0 )g = 0 In contrast to the case of industry wide agreements, information sharing cannot arise in equilibrium when decisions on information sharing are taken independently.
Proposition 2 Consider independent decisions on information sharing. With private values, sharing information is strictly dominated.
Proof. We show that, for any s i > s l ; sharing information is strictly worse than not sharing if the rival …rm shares information (step 1), and similarly if the rival …rm does not share information (step 2). Therefore, the ex ante pro…t of …rm i is strictly higher if i does not share information.
Step 1. Suppose that …rm j shares its information. We …rst argue that for all realizations of s i and s j ; the pro…t of …rm i is weakly lower if it shares information than if it does not. If …rm i shares its information, given s i and s j its pro…t equals max f0; s i s j g : Suppose that …rm i does not share information. Any e¤ort x j > s j is strictly dominated for …rm j: Moreover, …rm j chooses x j = s j with probability zero. Therefore, by choosing x i = 0 if s i s j ; and x i = s j if s i > s j ; …rm i can guarantee itself a pro…t of max f0; s i s j g ; and its equilibrium pro…t cannot be lower.
It remains to show that …rm i's interim expected pro…t is strictly higher if it does not share information. Suppose i does not share information. As argued above, for any s j > s l the corresponding critical signal s 0 is strictly smaller than s j : 7 Thus, for any s i > s l ; if s j happens to be equal to s i , the corresponding s 0 is strictly smaller than s i ; hence …rm i chooses strictly positive e¤ort and has a strictly positive pro…t. By continuity, this is still true if s j 2 (s i ; s i + ) for some > 0: On the other hand, if …rm i shares information, it gets zero pro…t whenever s j s i : It follows that whenever s j 2 [s i ; s i + ) ; …rm i 's pro…t is strictly higher if …rm i does not share information. Together with the last paragraph, this implies that …rm i's interim expected pro…t is strictly higher if it does not share information.
Step 2. Now suppose that …rm j does not share information. We focus on an interim perspective and show that given any signal s i > s l ; the pro…t of …rm i is strictly higher if it does not share information. (If s i = s l ; the pro…t of …rm i is zero whether or not it shares information.) 7 Here s 0 is de…ned in Lemma 1, replacing subscript 1 by j and subscript 2 by i: Remember that here …rm j shares information, whereas in Lemma 1 …rm 1 shares information. Similarly, the …rm that does not share is …rm i here and …rm 2 in Lemma 1.
If …rm i with signal s i does not share information, its pro…t is
If …rm i shares information, by Lemma 1 (replacing subscript 1 by i and subscript 2 by j) …rm i gets a pro…t of
which is equal to the probability that j has a signal lower than s 0 and thus chooses zero e¤ort, multiplied by i's value s i . If s 0 = s l ; we are done since the pro…t of i equals zero if it shares its information, while the pro…t of i is strictly positive if i does not share its information. Therefore, suppose in the following that s 0 > s l : Then the critical signal s 0 is determined such that
As argued above, s 0 < s i . For notational convenience, let denote the di¤erence between the pro…ts (7) and (8):
Straightforward manipulations show that
Rewriting the last term and using (9) gives
The …rst and the second term are both strictly positive since s l < s 0 < s i , and the third term is nonnegative. Thus > 0:
If an industry-wide agreement on information sharing is not possible, there is a unique equilibrium where …rms do not share their information. Independently of the rival's decision, they prefer to keep their own information secret. 8 In the asymmetric situation where only …rm 1 shares its signal, the interim pro…t of …rm 1 is increasing in s 1 : Thus one might conjecture that a …rm with a high signal may have an incentive to share its information. However, the interim pro…t in the case where no …rm shares its information is also increasing in one's own type. In fact, if F is the uniform distribution on the unit interval, is monotonically increasing in s 1 : the higher one's signal, the higher is the bene…t from hiding keeping it hidden. In general, however, is not monotone. 9 The result that information sharing is dominated holds not only if this decision has to be taken before the …rms receive their signals. Since the proof of Proposition 2 considers an interim perspective, …rm i has a dominant strategy not to share information for each possible signal i can obtain. Hence, if the decisions on information sharing were taken only after having received the signal, Proposition 2 would in a sense still hold. Equivalently, …rms do not have an incentive to reconsider their decision and, for instance, inform the rival in case they have a high value of winning the contest.
To be more precise, consider the following game:
1. Firms privately receive their signals.
2. Firms decide independently whether or not to share their signals. As above, sharing information means providing hard evidence that fully reveals the realization of one's signal.
3. The contest takes place.
We argue that this game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where no …rm ever shares its information. In this equilibrium, the beliefs of a …rm about the signal of its rival are as follows. If …rm i does not reveal its signal, …rm j believes that s i is distributed according to the ex ante distribution F: If …rm i deviates and reveals its signal, the belief of j is pinned down by the hard evidence, that is, …rm j knows s i . Now suppose that …rm j never reveals its signal. Consider whether …rm i wants to reveal its signal on stage 2: This is exactly the comparison we did in the proof of Proposition 2, step 2: for any s i > s l ; …rm i is strictly better o¤ if it does not reveal its signal. To give an example where is not monotone, suppose that signals are distributed according to F (s) = s 3 on the unit interval. 10 The game may have other equilibria. We are exploring this issue in ongoing research.
Common values
In the previous section, we assumed that the …rms' values v i are private. In many environments, however, it is reasonable to assume that the values of winning depend on the other …rm's signal as well. This section studies common values where
We assume that v is nonnegative, continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in s 1 and s 2 , and symmetric, i.e. v (s 1 ; s 2 ) = v (s 2 ; s 1 ) for all (s 1 ; s 2 ).
Industry-wide agreements
Both …rms share information Here, at the contest stage, the values of winning v 1 and v 2 are commonly known. As before, under complete information, there is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. With v 1 = v 2 = v, we have complete rent dissipation, and expected pro…ts are zero.
The sum of the expected e¤orts of both …rms is equal to v (s 1 ; s 2 ) : Ex ante expected e¤orts are equal to the expected value of winning
No …rm shares information Here, …rm i knows s i but not s j : Krishna and Morgan (1997) have shown that there is a symmetric equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies x i = (s i ) where
To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose …rm j follows the strategy . If i chooses its e¤ort according to but as if its signal was z; it gets a pro…t of
Since v is strictly increasing in its arguments, the integrand is strictly positive for all t < s i and strictly negative for all t > s i , and it is optimal for i to choose z = s i .
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Ex ante expected pro…ts are equal to
and hence higher than if both …rms share their information.
Proposition 3 Consider industry-wide agreements to share information about a common value where …rm i shares its information if and only if …rm j does. Then there will be no information sharing in equilibrium.
Proof. Not sharing information leads to a positive expected pro…t given in (10), but sharing information gives zero pro…t. Contrary to the case of private values of winning, the …rms' pro…ts are higher if they do not share their information with their rival, and thus an agreement on industry-wide information sharing can not arise in equilibrium.
Independent commitments to share information
We now consider information sharing with independent decisions. As above, this necessitates considering the case where only one …rm shares its informa-tion. Again, the equilibrium exhibits properties of each of the two symmetric cases, where either both …rms share information or no …rm does.
Lemma 2 Consider the case of a common value v (s 1 ; s 2 ). Suppose the signal of …rm 1 is commonly known, whereas s 2 is private information of …rm 2: The equilibrium is unique. Firm 2 plays a pure strategy
Proof. First, we show that this is an equilibrium. Consider …rm 1 and suppose it chooses an e¤ort x 1 2
Higher e¤orts are obviously suboptimal since they can be lowered without changing the probability of winning. Let z = 1 2 (x 1 ) : The pro…t of …rm 1 equals
Therefore, …rm 1 is indi¤erent between all these e¤orts. Now consider …rm 2. Its pro…t is
Suppose …rm 2 chooses e¤ort as if its signal were z: Then it gets
Since the integrand is strictly positive whenever t < s 2 ; and strictly negative whenever t > s 2 ; the optimal choice is z = s 2 :
Observe that from the point of view of …rm 1, the expected value of winning is E s 2 [v (s 1 ; s 2 )], and …rm 2's value of winning is distributed on If exactly one …rm shares its information, ex ante expected e¤orts are the same for both …rms. In fact, the distribution of the e¤ort of the …rm that shares information,
is the same as the distribution of the e¤orts of the …rm that does not share information:
Using the equilibrium of the contest in case only one …rm shares information, we can derive the incentives for information sharing with independent decisions. Proposition 4 Consider the case of common values and independent decisions about information sharing. Regardless of the choice of strategy of its rival, for any s j > s l ; …rm j earns an expected pro…t of zero by sharing information and a strictly positive expected pro…t by not sharing information. Thus sharing information is strictly dominated.
Proof. Suppose …rm i shares information. If …rm j also shares information, it earns zero expected pro…ts, as has been shown in the proof of Lemma 2. If j does not share information, i randomizes its contest e¤ort as in (12) and j chooses an e¤ort as in (11) . Hence, given s i , …rm j's expected pro…t
is strictly positive for any s j > s l : A fortiori, ex ante expected pro…t is strictly positive, and the best reply is not to share information.
Suppose that …rm i does not share information. If …rm j shares information, j randomizes its contest e¤ort as in (12) . Its expected pro…t is zero. If it does not share information, it gets a strictly positive pro…t by (10) . Thus j strictly prefers not to share information.
Note that the proof of Proposition 4 also establishes that sharing information is dominated from an interim perspective. Hence, if the decisions on information sharing were taken only after having received the signal, there is still no incentive to share information, just as in the case of private values (see the discussion following Proposition 2).
We now compare expected pro…ts and e¤orts across the di¤erent information structures. Due to the common value, the winner of the contest has the same value as the loser, and there cannot be an allocative ine¢ ciency. Ex post, the sum of pro…ts is
and the sum of pro…ts and e¤orts is always v (s 1 ; s 2 ). Consequently, the sum of expected pro…ts and expected e¤orts has to be the same in all information structures. Therefore, the ranking of expected e¤orts is just the opposite of the ranking of expected pro…ts.
If both …rms share information, expected pro…ts are zero; otherwise the sum of expected pro…ts is strictly positive. Therefore, expected e¤orts are highest if both …rms share information. The comparison between the remaining cases, however, depends on the function v:
share. If v is modular, j's pro…t is the same in both cases. If v is submodular, j's pro…t is lower if i shares information than if no …rm shares.
This implies that, whenever v is modular or submodular, (1) the sum of expected pro…ts is lower, and (2) the sum of expected e¤orts is higher if exactly one …rm shares information than if no …rm shares information. If v is supermodular, expected e¤orts may be higher if no …rm shares information.
In the common values environment, …rms prefer to keep their information secret, whether or not an industry wide agreement on information sharing is possible. The ranking of the expected e¤orts show that they are highest if both …rms share their information with their rival. Therefore, contrary to the case of private values, agreements on information sharing about a common value can be desirable from a welfare point of view if the investments in the contest are socially valuable. In fact, if the value of the e¤orts to society is higher than their cost to the …rms (i.e. > 1), then a legal requirement to share information is welfare improving.
Conclusion
This paper considered incentives to share information ahead of competition in markets that are described by an all-pay auction. We …rst considered private values. We found that, with industry-wide agreements, …rms are indi¤erent between sharing and not sharing information. Thus, an industry-wide agreement on information sharing may emerge in equilibrium. Aggregate e¤orts, however, are higher without information sharing. In such a situation, a ban on industry-wide agreements on information sharing is a Pareto improvement whenever e¤ort generates positive spillovers outside of the contest as, for example,may be the case in a procurement contest or a R&D race. With independent decisions whether or not to share information, however, sharing information is strictly dominated.
Second, we considered a common values framework, where the true value of winning is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and symmetric function of the …rms'private signals. Here, e¤orts are highest if both …rms share information. Information sharing will not arise in equilibrium -…rms are strictly better of if they do not share information, no matter whether they decide individually, where information sharing is a strictly dominated strategy, or consider an industry-wide agreement. When the e¤ort generates positive spillovers outside of the contest, information sharing may be ine¢ ciently low. Thus, whereas there may be too much information sharing with private values, there may be too little information sharing with common values.
where the last line uses the symmetry of v: If s 2 = s l ; …rm 2 chooses an e¤ort of zero in both cases, and Since …rm 1's pro…t is zero if it shares information, the sum of the pro…ts is strictly lower in (S; N ) than in (N; N ) whenever v is modular or submodular. Correspondingly, the sum of expected e¤orts is higher in (S; N ) than in
